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April 9, 1992 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
APR 9 1992 
CLERK SUPREME C0UR1 
UTAH 
Re: Scott v. Hammock, Case No. 910112 
Rule 24(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this letter is being submitted to advise you of the recent 
promulgation of Rule 503, Utah Rules of Evidence, which will become 
effective on April 15, 1992. 
Rule 503 will supplant Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3), the 
clergy-penitent privilege statute at issue in this case, which is 
cited throughout the briefs. 
The promulgation of Rule 503 will certainly give rise to 
questions regarding the application of the rule in this case. For 
that reason, we will take this opportunity to also advise you of 
illustrative authorities addressing the impropriety of retroactive 
application of an expanded evidentiary privilege. The following 
authorities address that subject: 
State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 517 A.2d 610, 612-14 (1986) 
(where communications not privileged when made, subsequent changes 
in law regarding privileges will not affect admissibility; "[e]ven 
if it is a procedural statute, which ordinarily will be applied 
retroactively without a legislative imperative to the contrary, Kit 
will not be applied retroactively if considerations of good sense 
and justice dictate that it not be so applied. ' " Quoting American 
Masons' Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., 174 Conn. 219, 223, 384 A.2d 
378 (1978), quoting Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 157 Conn. 
92, 96, 249 A.2d 58 (1968)). 
Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis.2d 190, 248 
N.W.2d 433, 439 (1977) (where party previously had a right to 
discovery of documents that were then not privileged, the 
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subsequent enactment of a privilege cannot alter that right; "the 
right to discovery has . . . become vested in plaintiffs . . . [and 
the new privilege statute] does affect the substantive rights of 
the plaintiffs and it cannot be given retroactive effect.") 
Woelfling v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 30 Ohio App.2d 
211, 285 N.E.2d 61, 68 (1972) ("the physician-patient privilege is 
a substantive right and not merely a rule of evidence.") 
DeSeve v. Ladd Enterprises, 137 111. App.3d 796, 484 N.E.2d 
1220, 1223 (1985) ("[E]ven where the legislative intent is clear 
that a statute be given retroactive effect, the enactment will not 
be applied when to do so would lead to unreasonable or unjust 
results.") 
State v. Ladiqes, 386 P.2d 416, 419 (Wash. 1963) ("As a 
general rule, . . . newly adopted court rules operate prospectively 
only.") 
20 Am.Jur.2d Courts S 85, at 447 ("[A] rule of court will 
ordinarily have prospective effect only. An exception to this rule 
is recognized, however, in instances where the enacting authority 
clearly indicates that a retroactive effect was intended.") 
Cresson Consolidated Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Whitten, 338 
P.2d 278, 284 (Colo. 1959) ("The legislature is not permitted, 
under the pretense of regulating evidence, to establish rules of 
evidence which prevent a party from exhibiting his rights or deny 
him the opportunity of a fair trial by virtually excluding evidence 
in his behalf; to do so would substantially deprive him of due 
process of law." Quoting Public Utilities Commission v. Donahue, 
335 P.2d 285, 291 (1959), quoting 20 Am.Jur. 38, S 8). 
No indication of whether Rule 503 is to be applied 
retroactively is found in the relevant constitutional provision 
(Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4), the relevant 
statutory provision (Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-4) or the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Note should be taken that, even with respect to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, those rules are not to be applied 
retroactively if "in the opinion of the court their application in 
a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be 
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former 
procedure applies." Rule 1(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
also Rules 1 and 86(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective July 1, 1975, 
were to be applied to "proceedings then pending, except to the 
extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a 
particular action or proceeding then pending would not be feasible 
or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Butler 
Page 3 
April 9, 1992 
applies." Orders of the Supreme Court of the United States 
Adopting and Amending Rules, Order of November 20f 1972, 
paragraph 2. See also Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
Very truly yours, 
Ross 
RCA:rr 
cc: Steven LeRoy Hammock 
Oscar W. McConkie, Esq. 
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